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T H E difficulty of digesting traditional myths which some Greek 
thinkers were facing led, so the mainstream modern argument 
goes,1 to the development of allegoresis. This method, ingenious 
though it appeared, was always replete with intellectual thorns. 
One of them, in the post-Platonic period at least, was the explicit 
rejection of myths by Socrates irrespective of whether or not they 
contain 'deep meanings' (ύπόνοίαι: Plato, Rep. 378 D - E ) . The Pla­
tonic strictures did not have the expected effect. Neither the succes­
sors of Plato in the Academy nor those other philosophical schools, 
Stoicism for example, deeply influenced by the Platonic legacy 
abandoned allegoresis because of the Platonic prohibition.2 
As Plutarch succinctly put it (And. poet. 15B-C), poetry re­
sembles the head of the octopus in that it is very pleasant to the 
senses but also liable to cause nightmares. And many nightmares 
poetry did cause, especially to those of a philosophic disposition. 
The basic criticism that Plato levels against art in general and poetry 
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in particular is their imitative character. Art is at a third remove 
from truth (Rep. 602 c), since it imitates particulars and instantia­
tions of the Forms3 rather than the Forms themselves. Before Plato 
μίμηση was used in medical texts to refer to the means whereby 
the art of medicine relates to the workings of nature.* In Aristotle 
μίμησις is what enables κάθαρσις, another term used in medicine, 
to take place. By and large, mimesis implied assimilation; it also 
implied approximation; but it implied deception by the same token.5 
To escape any undesired overtones, Plato coined the word μέθ^ξπ. 
In his mind, worldly things participate in the Forms (and the Forms 
are present in, and in contact with, particulars) but artefacts imitate 
worldly things.6 
Proclus had an extreme reverence for Plato, but he had an equal 
reverence for Homer.' He thought that the age-old quarrel between 
1
 Here and in what follows the terms 'Idea' and 'Form' are used indiscriminately, 
the preference of one over the other being a matter of style. 
* Cf. Hipp. De victu 1. 11-24 (vi. 477 fî. Littré). 
' Cf. Demoer. Β 154; Antiphon A 3 (=Xen. Mem. ι. 6ff.); Herod. 3. 37; Aesch. 
fr. 353 Dind.; Thuc, 1. 95. 3; Ar. Thesm. 149 ff.; Gorgias Β 23. 
' Cf. Rep. 597 Β ff.; Phaedo 100 c ff. I have not studied all the relevant Platonic 
passages with a view to establishing the claim that Plato never uses 'imitation' to refer 
to the relationship between Forms and particulars, but the examples that D. F. Ast 
gives {Lexicon Platonicum s.vv. μίθίξις, μετέχω, μςτάπχίσιί, μετόχι;, μίμημα, μίμηαις, 
μιμητή;, μιμητικός, μιμούμαι) seem to indicate that this is indeed the case; at any rate, 
the preponderance of 'participation' over 'imitation' when reference is made to the 
Forms plainly shows Plato's inclination. 
' The most significant recent contributions to the understanding of Proclus* lit­
erary exegesis are, in reverse chronological order: Oiva Kuisma, Proclus' Defence of 
Homer [Defence] (Helsinki, 1996); Wolfgang Bernard, Späianlike Dichtungstheorien: 
Untersuchungen zu Proklos, Herakleitos und Plutarch [Dichtungstheorien] (Stuttgart, 
1990); Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian [Homer] (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London, 1986); Anne D. R. Sheppard, Studies on the 5th andòth Essays of Pro-
clus' Commentary on the Republic [Studies] (Göttingen, 19S0); James A. Coulter, The 
Literary Microcosm [Microcosm] (Leiden, 1976). The works of Proclus mentioned 
in this paper are cited from the following editions: 
In Remp, Prodi in Platonis Rem publicum commentarti, ed. W. Kroll (2 vols.; Leipzig, 
2S99-1901). 
In Tim. Prodi in Platonis Timaeum commentarla, ed. E. Diehl (3 vols.; Leipzig 
1903-6), 
In Parm. Prodi commentarius in Platonis Parmentdem (=Prodiphilosophi Platonici 
opera inedita, Jiars tertia), ed. V. Cousin (Paris, 1864; repr. Hildesheim, 
196O. 
ET Proclos: The Elements of Theology, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 
— 1963)· 
PT Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerînk 
(6 vols.; Paris, 1968-98). 
H. Prodi Hymni, ed. E. Vogt (Wiesbaden, 1957). 
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philosophy and poetry in the tenth book of the Republic (607 B) 
could be settled. The optimistic view that writers may one day 
successfully defend poetry and present a convincing account of 
its value in verse or prose is mentioned as an open possibility in 
the Republic (607 c-608 B). The accusation brought against poetry 
will be inconclusive, Socrates the fair-minded holds, unless the 
offended side is also given a voice before the tribunal of reason. 
And Proclus undertakes precisely this task. He assumes the role 
of poetry's advocate—which, among philosophers, is that of devil's 
advocate. 
The Aristotelian understanding of imitation as an important fea­
ture of human nature deeply influenced Proclus' attitude towards 
art.* The cathartic function of mimesis played an important part 
in his defence of poetry. The discrepancy, however, between Plato 
and his exegete of the fifth century AD is puzzling none the less. 
While Plato condemned poetry as imitation, Proclus takes its imi­
tative character for granted and construes Plato in such a way that 
the poets are banned from the ideal state not because their art is 
imitation, but because it is bad imitation. 
Unlike some other commentaries by Proclus," In Rempublicam, 
the mam text in which he expounds his theory of poetic symbolism 
and of mimesis in poetry, consists of a collection of independent es­
says. Two fundamental purposes permeate the separate discourses 
of the work: (1) the removal of contradictions detectable in the 
Platonic corpus and (2) the refutation of those critics of Plato who 
accused him of looking down upon poetry. Proclus saves poets from 
philosophic disrepute and frees Plato from allegations of poetic in-
sensitivity by using Platonic principles.10 
I shall first present some of the main arguments of the fifth and 
sixth discourses of In Rempublicam and then attempt a synthesis. 
Although my springboard is the Proclan commentary, I shall try 
Sacr. De sacrificio: 'Proclus: TIcpl -η)? καβ' Έλληνα? κρατική? τεχ^ΐ ' , ed. J. Bidez 
in J. Bidez, E Cumont, A. Delatte, Ο. Lagergrantz, and J. Ruska (eds.), 
Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques grecs, vi (Brussels, 1928), 137—51. 
In Remp. i. 46. 14—15 <j>iaei yàp την φνχην -ημών χαίρ(ΐν Tofy μιμήμασιν, Sta και 
φιλόμνθοι ιτάντες έσμίν. 
* Cf. Ε. Lamberz, 'Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars', in-I 
Pépin and H. D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris, 1987), 
1-20. 
10
 Cf. J. Trouillard, L'un et l'âme selon Proclos (Paris, 1972), 72. 
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to address larger questions concerning symbolism in poetry and 
literature's claim to truth. 
i . The development of the argument 
The first question that Proclus raises refers to an apparent contra-
diction in the writings of Plato: why does Plato expel the poets from 
the ideal state in the third and tenth books of the Republic when he 
himself explicitly states here and elsewhere (Rep. 398 A; Ion 533 D-
534 E; Phdr. 264 B) that poetry is sacred and the poetic inspiration 
of divine origin? In reply to that question Proclus distinguishes 
between an imitation that is unfaithful to the imitated things and 
another that is faithful to them. The unfaithful poetic imitation 
refers to the names, attributes, and deeds of gods and heroes who 
are treated inadequately by the poets (In Remp. i. 44. 6-17). But 
there is a difference between their respective treatments. The tales 
told about the gods are, to be sure, myths. They are lies certainly, 
Proclus argues following Plato, but they are good lies because they 
hide the (ineffable) truth about the gods under the guise of beautiful 
words which, by the same token, reveal the beauty of the divine (i. 
44. 23—6). By contrast, the poetical treatment of heroes is utterly 
misleading, because the heroes are represented like ordinary hu-
man beings with all the weaknesses and imperfections of common 
people (i. 44. 26-45. *)· The same holds true when the gods are 
said to steal, rape, commit incest, or fight one another. When gods 
are represented as fallible mortals, imitation fails (i. 45. 17-27). It 
is not the representational aspect of imitation that is faulty but the 
inadequacy of representation. In a later passage (i. 63. 21—8) Pro-
clus speaks of the unfaithfulness of imitation not only with respect 
to gods and heroes but also with respect to members of the human 
species. Poetry is bad and unsuccessful when, as often happens, 
men are presented speaking like women, slaves like masters, brave 
men like cowards, simpletons like philosophers. 
But imitation can also be faithful. This happens when men are 
represented in the variegated fashion that is part and parcel of 
their nature (i. 46. 23-9). The poets succeed in imitating humans, 
for they depict them with all the passions, turmoils, sufferings, 
and vicissitudes that normally characterize them. But it is precisely 
where imitation succeeds that its educational value becomes suspect 
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(i. 46. 29-47. *4)· For by imitating the variety of human passions 
and the diversity of man's attitudes, the poets do not manage tc 
raise themselves and their audience above the phenomenal world, 
ittain to immovable truth, and acquire a vision of perfection. 
Ergo: -when men are represented the imitative character of poetry 
is faithful, but its educational validity is nil; when heroes are rep­
resented the poetic imitation is both unfaithful and misleading; 
when gods are represented imitation is unfaithful and untrue but 
it conduces to truth (i. 47. 14-19). This arrangement of kinds of 
imitation provided by Proclus is not yet a reply to the initial ques­
tion of the sacredness of poetry. It has, however, cleared the ground 
for an eventual answer. To that end a new notion is needed, that 
of symbolism. Before its introduction into the discussion Proclus 
makes a new beginning by assuming the divine origin of poetry. 
'We all take it for granted', he says, 'that the art of poetry is sacred 
and that it came to humans from the Muses by means of the inspi­
ration that they imparted to the poets' (i. 47. 20-2). This statement 
is in perfect accord with what Socrates claimed in the Ion when he 
pointed out that only when a man is possessed by a god is he truly 
a poet (534 B; cf. Phdr. 265 A-B). But whereas the argument is used 
there to baffle Ion with respect to his supposed understanding of 
Homer or to'prove that the knowledge of the philosopher is no less 
divinely inspired and sublime than that of the poet, here the same 
argument is summoned to disprove the allegations of inconsistency 
among the various claims of the third and tenth books of the Repub­
lic. Proclus insists that it is only from the best polity, only from the 
ideal republic, that poetry should be expelled (i. 47. 26-48. 1). In 
all other social organizations that bear the Platonic ideal in mind, 
but do not manage concretely to realize it here and now, poetry is 
indispensable. Then Proclus introduces the concept of symbol. An 
elaboration of what is meant by the term will occur only later, in the 
sixth discourse. The concept is here used rather prematurely, since 
at this point Proclus does not seem to have clarified the difference 
between σνμβολον and eUdiv, or symbolism and mimesis. 
Proclus asserts that what is said symbolically helps even the low­
est of the partial intellects to elevate themselves to the divine realm. 
By means of the symbols an unobstructed intuition of the divine 
comes down to visit us (i. 48.1-13). There are people for whom art 
that imitates the variety of human characters and demeanours is 
more useful than that which imitates only simple characters. Those 
254 Spyridon Rangos 
unable to philosophize cannot attain to divine wisdom through dis­
ciplined reasoning; to those truth can only be suggested, not fully 
established, by means of symbolic language that approximates the 
world of true being. Having mentioned the concept of simplicity, 
Proclus then expounds an argument clarifying what is meant by 
the simple (i. 48. 20-4). The simple, he says, is twofold: it is either 
what is better or else what is worse than the multifarious. In cities 
ruled authoritatively by one single man, variety in art is preferable 
to artistic simplicity (i. 48. 13-20). For in those cities the simple 
is worse than the varied since the simple conforms to the abso­
lute will of the tyrant, which is by definition bad and hateful. It 
is only in the best polity that the simple should by all means be 
sought out and established, since it is only there that knowledge 
/of the Form of goodness is the sole factor that determines political 
and social affairs. The simple to be found in the ideal state is the 
good. This same simple good prompts gods to possess mortals and 
turn them into poets. But since the political communities to which 
poetry addresses itself are not ideal, it is not inappropriate that di­
vine inspiration engenders imitation of the varied rather than the 
simple. Thus we are led to see the compatibility between belief in 
the divine origin of poetry and its banishment from the ideal state 
(i. 48. 24-6). 
However, the exile of the poets was not total. Plato believed 
that some types of poetry, such as hymns to the gods and encomia 
to exceptionally brave mortals, could be retained in his republic 
because they would promote piety and virtue (Rep. 607 A). Proclus 
took Plato seriously: he himself composed hymns which diverge 
from the traditional genre in that they do not relate the birth and 
adventures of a deity but describe his/her powers in a language 
firmly rooted in philosophic speculation.11 Such hymns to gods 
can be easily accommodated in the context of an ideal polity. But 
the principal targets of the Platonic critique were tragic and comic 
dramas and what, like Homeric epic poetry,11 most resembled them 
" A representative example of Proclan poetry is his hymn to the Muses. The first 
nine verses (H. 3. 1-9) praise the Muses' power characterized as 'light that drives 
upwards' {ίναγώγιμον φώ;) and describe how they manage to jaise the mind above 
materia]_conditions and save it from the thick forgetfulness of earthly misery. The 
last eight verses (10-17) summon the divine power and beg for its assistance in the 
poet's own life. 
t 2
 Plato, Rep. 589 D την τζ τραγωΒίαν και τον •ηγ€μόνα αντήί *Ομ·ηρον. Ci. In Remp. 
i. 196.5. 
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by giving voice to the characters of myth in direct speech. Thes 
poetic genres were considered to allow for, and be grounded ir 
imitation of the varied in its most evident form of impersonation. 
The Aristotelian understanding of poetry had defended traged 
and comedy through the introduction of the notion of catharsis 
Proclus felt the need to harmonize the apparent divergence (i. 4c 
13-20). He distinguishes the effects of dramatic poetry on the lif 
of the mature citizen body from its effects on the education of tb 
young (i. 49. 25), and manages to side with Aristotle in all essentia 
points but also to defend the Platonic view in some sense. 
Human passions, Proclus says, cannot be eradicated from th< 
human soul. There is no way that the pathetic faculty of the sou 
can be cut off from the rest of the psychic faculties and thrown away 
But the passions should not be allowed fulfilment either, because 
that would result in their supremacy over reason.14 The solution is 
that they should be properly channelled and allowed indulgence and 
'movement' in specific prearranged periods of time.15 This .is the 
function that tragedy and comedy are called to accomplish. They 
can discharge the burden of accumulated passions and purify the 
souls of the spectators. But what is good and useful for grown-up 
citizens would be disastrous for the immature souls of adolescent 
boys and girls who do not as yet know how to distinguish good 
from evil (i. 50. 2-51. 18). The didactic function of drama is based 
precisely on the capacity of discernment that youths and maidens 
still lack. For that reason, Proclus argues, Plato banned dramatic 
performances from his republic. 
But then, with an astonishing argumentative leap, Proclus claims 
that the educational value of drama being nil, tragedy and comedy 
should be prohibited because they are superfluous to grown-ups 
and harmful to teenagers (i, 51. 18-20). Proclus seems to have 
moved too far in the Platonic direction, and obviously against the 
wish that he expressed in his introducton (i. 42. 10-15; cf- i- 49· 
13-17). The sought-for combination of the Platonic absolute pro­
hibition against the poetry of passions with the Aristotelian theory 
of purification has led Proclus to find the justification of the Platonic 
imperative in the excesses not of poetry as such but of some poetic 
" Cf. G. Μ. Α. Grube, Plato's Thought [Thought], new edn. (London, 1980), 185. 
In Remp. i. 42. 13—14 a [sc. τά πάθη] μήτΐ ηαντάττααι α—οκλίιειρ δυνατοί μήτί 
ζμπιμ-ττλάναι πάλιν άοφαλίς. 
In Remp. i. 42. 14 Seópeva [sc. τα TTBÔTJ] δη rivos tv καιρώ κινήοανς. Cf. t. 51. 4. 
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genres, and possibly in the excesses of the actual tragic and comic 
dramas of the fifth century.16 Since poetry is imitative by nature, 
perfect poetry must use myths and imitate (i. 65. 25-9). But the 
task of perfect poetry—it is only in perfection that one can see the 
true nature of a thing"—is to make myths that are similar to the 
imitated subjects. For if the myths are dissimilar, then the imitated 
subjects are destined to concealment. The function of poetry is to 
reveal by mimesis, not to cover and disguise.1* 
The foregoing points of harmonization between Platonic phi-
losophy and poetic thought derive from the general introductory 
remarks that cover pp. 42-69 of the first volume of Kroll's edition 
of In Rempublicam, or the fifth discourse.'* It seems that Proclus 
was not fully satisfied with them.20 He reiterates the problem of 
the relationship of philosophy to poetry by focusing on the Home-
ric myths and their use in Platonic dialogues. He also presents a 
theory of myth which does not distinguish myths devised by the 
philosophico-poetical mind of Plato from traditional tales of the 
Homeric epics.21 In the sixth discourse, which is worthier of atten-
'* In Remp. i, 50. 21—4 cVecVa; Bè ήρα τάΐ ποιήσει; irpòs rjj ττοικιλία και το άμίτρον 
(χουαας fv rais των παθών τούτων ττροκλήσζσιν ττολλοϋ SeûJ ÉIS άφοσίωαιν civai χρησίμους. 
It seems unlikely that an intellectual to w h o m tradit ion ascribed the composit ion 
of such a purely philological work as the Χρηστομαθία had n o knowledge of classical 
l iterature, and of 5th-cent. d r a m a in particular, other than that derived from Plato's 
quotat ions. 
" Cf. In Remp. L 7 5 . 2 5 - 8 . T h e ninth and tenth questions of the fifth discourse [In 
Remp. i. 67. 10-69. I 0 ) deal with perfect poet ry a n d with the divine poetic parad igm 
b y imitat ing which h u m a n poetry comes into being. T h e int roductory s u m m a r y 
remark makes this p o i n t clear (In Remp. i. 43 . 22-3 TI'S ό èv τω παντι ironj-nji; eh 
Sv βλίτων και ο rjjie -ποιητή; τίΰξίται τον otVet'ou TEAODJ). Several traditional deities 
(Zeus, Apollo, Hermes , Asclepius, and the Sirens) are s u m m o n e d to act as the divine 
prototypes of poetic genres [In Remp. i. 68. 24-69. 19). 
In Remp. 1. 65. 29—30 ófiot'ou? [sc. μύθους] -πλάτταν τοις ντϊοκςιμό>θίς, άλλα μη Sia 
TÙV ανόμοιων ίθΐλκιν αυτά κρυτττζίν. 
" I have omitted the m o r e specific points about t h e relat ionship between tragedy 
and comedy, the appropr ia te a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e r h y t h m s and musical scales, and 
Plato's view of Solon, all of which Proclus discusses (In Remp. 1. 51. 2 6 - 6 5 . >5). 
taking his departure from a casual, or less casual, Socratic claim, 
1 0
 It is accepted that the sixth discourse was composed later a n d is m o r e sophis­
ticated t h a n the fifth. See C. Gallavott i , 'Eterogenei tà e cronologia dei comment i di 
Proclo alla Republ ica ' , Rivista di filologia e di instruzione classica, 57 (1929), 208—19, 
and ' I n to rno ai comment i di Proclo alla Republ ica ' , Ballettino del Comitato per la 
Preparazione dell'Edizione nazionale dei Classici Greci e Latini, 19 (1971). 4 t - 5 4 l 
Sheppard , Studies, 15-38. 
" Proclus ' extensive t rea tment of the Platonic my th of E r in the sixteenth treatise 
(In Remp. ii. 96 -359) , for instance, is identical with his t rea tment of the my ths of 
Homer. Proclus does not distinguish between popu la r myths and myths devised for 
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tion than the fifth, Proclus seems to have changed his mind about 
the expulsion of the poets. Instead of claiming that poetry should 
be banned from actual polities or from the ideal state, he holds that, 
if some necessary distinctions are drawn, poetry might be retained 
in all constitutions. The important concept here is appropriate dis­
crimination. In fact the preservation of poetry applies only to those 
advanced in philosophy, and therefore, in harmony with the earlier 
view, excludes the uninitiated. 
Of all poets it was Homer and Hesiod who, according to an often-
quoted Herodotean dictum (2. 53), provided the Greeks with their 
divine mythology. Of the two, Homer excelled in the consciousness 
of tradition and outclassed his rival both in poetic skilfulness and in 
myth-making capacity: the Homeric epics have been characterized, 
not without reason, as the books of the Hellenic Bible." It comes 
as no surprise that when Proclus begins to deal with the symbolic 
language of poetry in a more detailed and scholarly way he limits 
his enquiry to Homer, 'the best and most divine of poets' (i. 158. 
6-11 =Plato, Ion 530 B-C). 
The pedagogical inap prop ria teness of some myths as opposed 
to others is stressed anew with a novel distinction between two 
kinds of myths (i. 8x. 11-12; cf. 84. 22 ff.).23 The genus of myth 
is split into the educative species (τταιδ^υτικόν) and the ritualist-
cum-perfecting—both notions coexist in the Greek term—species 
(τ^λεστικόν). The former, which has morality as its goal, is also po­
litical, whereas the latter, aiming at contact with the divine, is meant 
for the gifted individual. Because contact with the divine presup­
poses exceptional determination, lifelong study, perseverance, and 
hard work, it can be attained only by the very few (i. 83. 14—18). 
The former type of mythology, by contrast, should be offered to 
the vast majority of people. This is also the type that is commonly 
known to the many as conducing to morality. Here Proclus has obvi­
ously the Platonic praises and hymns in mind. Now, since the body 
politic comprises the entire population and is,- as a result, numeri-
a particular philosophic purpose. For him all myths are, in essence, poetic because 
the medium of poetry is myth. Philosophy may occasionally use traditional myths 
or create new ones, but then philosophy is no longer in its proper domain. Proclus' 
distinction is, for the most part, the traditional distinction between λόγο; and μύθος. 
" Cf. Κ. W. Gransden, 'Homer and the Epic', in M. I. Finley (ed.), The Legacy 
of Greece: A New Appraisal (Oxford, 1981), 65—92. 
u
 Cf. Kuisma, Defence, 103 ff. 
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cally characterized by the many, the political training of the citizens 
must be based on this educative and ethical species of myth . But the 
hoi polloi of the democratic regime of Socrates ' t ime are the young 
of the Platonic republic (i. 83. 7-12) . Hence the restriction applies 
equally to the many of any constitution other than the ideal, but 
only to the young of the Platonic polity. However, this restriction 
does not mean that the telestic kind is of no value. Telest ic myths 
are indeed of higher value since they reveal the mysteries of the 
gods. But the two types should be kept separate at all costs. Since 
the telestic myths are hermetic and, therefore, unintelligible to the 
uninitiated mind, the many, trained as they are to unders tand ethi-
cal myths, tend not only to miss the meaning of telestic myths but , 
what is most dangerous, to misconstrue the intentions of the poet. 
/Absurdity in myth is an indication that a deeper meaning lies hidden.1* 
Confusion arises if and only if the telestic species of myth is mi s -
takenly taken to be educative. Th i s happens to all those people who 
take the Homeric myths (which are telestic) at their face value (as if 
they were ethical myths). And these myths are subject to Socrates' 
stipulation that poetry should be purified before it is accepted in the 
ideal state. T h e kind of poetry that is there discussed is, according 
to Proclus, the political type, which should by all means be of the 
ethical species. 
Proclus ' fundamental proposit ion revolves around the distinction 
between the proper use of myth and its inappropriate use, be it 
misuse or abuse. We cannot judge the value of wine, he points 
out, from its excessive misuse by immoderate men . Intoxication, 
in itself a divine gift, should not be prohibited merely because it 
sometimes results in indecent behaviour (i. 75. 29-76 , on Plato, 
Leg. 646 A) . Excessive drunkenness is the effect, not the cause, of 
imprudent demeanour. Likewise, the myths are not to be judged 
by the misconstruals forcefully attached to them by the unwise, 
who cannot elevate themselves above the world of the senses. If 
incest, castration, robbery, and the like occur in the tales of the 
gods, it is because the symbolic language of myth narrates in visual 
imagery what should be unders tood as atemporal divine reality (i. 
81 . 28 ff.). T h e myths are not to blame if foolish people, incapable 
** Cf. J. Pépin, 'Porphyre, exégète d'Homère', in Porphyre (Entretiens sur l'anti-
quité classique, 12; Vandœuvres-Genève, 1966), 229-72, esp. 251 ff.; R. Lamberton, 
'The Neoplatonists and the Spiritualization of Homer', in Lamberton and Keaney, 
Readers, 115-33. 
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of scratching the surface and grasping the theological meaning, take 
them at their face value, ignore the symbolism contained therein, 
and ascribe indecent behaviour to the divine order. 
2. Two principles of allegorization 
The so-called allegorical reading of Proclus, based on the oral teach­
ing of his master Syrianus,25 follows two principles. They both de­
rive from the hierarchical construction of reality as he expounded 
it with utmost logical coherence and supreme condensation in The 
Elements of Theology. The account given there is a rigorous de­
duction of all reality from the One (cf. ET 11-12) on the basis of 
some elementary logical premisses. The recurrent model is that of 
the mirror, with the concomitant syzygy of prototype and repre­
sentation, original and copy.This model presents the fundamental 
law of all reality, the law of causality, whose logical expression in 
propositional terms is that the cause is always superior to its effect 
(ET 7).' The two principles of Proclan allegorization of myths can 
be ultimately reduced to the one single principle of causation, but 
for clarity they are here presented as separate. 
The first principle distinguishes metaphysical reality (the do­
main of the gods which transcends sense perception) from physical 
operations. Of primary importance here are the concepts of tempo­
rality and of divisibility. Both time and corporeality acquire their 
existence from the transcendent principles: they are the mirror im­
ages of eternity and immateriality respectively (cf. ET 52-5, 72, 
94). Since the medium of the poetic art is myth—the poet is a poet 
of myths, not of rational accounts, Plato said in the Phaedo (61 B ) — 
when the poet comes to describe the divine realm he is bound to 
express the theological message by means of images, the essential 
components of mythology. Thus myths represent the indivisible 
and incorporeal as divisible and material, the timeless and eternal 
as temporal and successive, and the intelligible as sensible (In Remp. 
i- 77· 9_79- 4; cf. ΡΤΊ. 31. 7-12). In that respect, poets imitate na­
ture. For nature first and foremost creates sensible images of the 
intelligible forms;16 and it is on the level of nature that the imagery 
" In Remp. i. 71. 2-6 and 24-7; cf. 95. 27-31. A full discussion of Proclus' debt 
to Syrianus can be found in Sheppard, Studies, 39-103. 
In Remp. 1. 77. 13—14 Ka' V Φ^οις εικόνας αημιουργσνσα των άΰλων και νοητών 
tlhwv, 
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of poetry functions. The 'Proclan assumption, the reverse of the 
empiricist view, holds that nothing comes to be in the senses that 
does not pre-exist in the divine intellect on the transcendent plane. 
The famous ejection of Hephaestus from Olympus, for example 
(Horn. Π. i . 594), is interpreted as showing the procession of the 
divine activity throughout the whole hierarchy of being down to the 
lowest planes of the sensible world (In Remp. i. 82. 10-12). More 
philosophically demanding is the Hesiodic myth in which Cronus is 
portrayed as swallowing his children (Th. 453-67). His binding and 
imprisoning of them in his own belly (cf. Th. 501-2) is explained as 
the ineffable union of cause and effect.27 The obstruction of activity, 
the impediment to free development (which is what we normally 
understand by 'binding'), is the distorted image ofa prototypical 
1 divine operation.28 This divine activity, we are led to conclude, is 
positive and praiseworthy because it allows things to stand in their 
causes.
2
* Without such standing-in-the-causes there would be no 
standing-together of the dispersed elements that constitute distinct 
beings, hence no separate entities. Things would,,rather, immedi­
ately crumble and disintegrate into chaotic indeterminacy. 
The second principle of Proclus' exegesis of divine myths (inti­
mately connected with, or rather subordinated to, the first) is the 
splitting of each deity into distinct entities in descending order of 
causal concatenation.30 By means of this device Proclus manages 
to accommodate some traits of the traditional tales about the gods 
that are incompatible with one another, without impairing the gods' 
simplicity or their self-caused unity (cf. ET 114) and without devi­
ating from the law of contradiction.31 An extreme example of this 
tendency can be seen in the commentary on the Timaeus (iii. 190. 
19-26), a work that Proclus had completed at the age of 28, accord-
" Cf. Plot. 5. 8. 12-13. The Hesiodic account of transference of universal power 
described as the mythic succession of divine personages to sovereignty attracted 
the Neoplatonists' attention early on. See P. Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus 
in Plotinus' Treatise against the Gnostics', in H. J. Blumen thai and R, A. Markus 
(eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought (London, 1981), 124-37. 
1 1
 In Remp. i. 82. 23-5. T h e interpretation given by Proclus cannot readily be 
accommodated to any of the classes of myth tabulated by Satäust (De dus et mundo 
4. 21-2 Nock). 
J
* InRempi't. 82. 14—16 οι δε Κρόνιοι heopoi την evwaiv της όλης δημιουργίας προς 
την voçpàv τοΰ Κρόνου καΐ ττατρικην νπζροχην δηλονοιν. 
'" In Remp. i. 92. 2-9; cf. £7"260; Bernard, Dickiungsikeorien, 95 ff. 
11
 Cf. L. J. Rosân, The Philosophy of Proclus (New York, 1949), 104-5. 
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ing to his biographer.52 There the philosopher splits Zeus into five 
distinct entities to account for the various attributes which Plato, 
in accordance with πάτριος νόμος and not without a tone of irony, 
ascribes to him.3 3 
3. Σύμβολον and είκών 
Proclus understands very well that if the imitative character of art 
is the primary reason for its rejection and if mimesis is the cause 
of literature's inadequacy, we shall be compelled to apply the same 
strict rule to the dialogues of Plato, whose mimetic character, and 
salient impersonation in particular, no one could possibly deny (In 
Remp. i. 161. 9-14; 163.2-5; 199.4-9). Because of this sensitive un­
derstanding of mimesis, Proclus prefers to speak of σύμβολα rather 
than μιμηματα τή$ άληθίίας. But he often identifies σύμβολα with 
etKoves των παρα&6ΐγμάτων. Both concepts could be accommodated 
in the context of a philosophical position that reveres Homer no 
less than Plato. But symbolism is a more flexible concept. It allows 
for contradictions between truth in the strict conceptual sense and 
the imagery of poetry. 
On a superficial reading, Proclus gives the impression that he 
wants it both ways: he states that the symbol does not imitate that 
of which it is a symbol;3'' he claims that poetry relies on imitation 
and that it is in imitation, when excellently performed, that one 
can grasp the true meaning of poetry;3 5 and he claims, moreover, 
that the poetic myths about deities of the Orphies (and of those 
who create similar théogonies) are symbols par excellence (PT i. 20. 
11
 Mar inus , Vita Prodi 3 2 9 - 3 0 Masul lo . 
" Cf. Plato, Cra i . 396 A; Garg. 523 A; Phdr. 246 E. 
In Remp, i. 198. 13—24 και -ηώς γαρ âV ή Sià συμβόλων τα Beta άφ^ρμηνΐύουσα 
μιμητική προσαγορεύοιτο; τα γαρ σύμβολα τούτων, ων ίοτι σύμβολα, μιμηματα ούκ ζοτιν 
τα μεν γαρ εναντία των εναντίων ούκ αν ποτέ μιμηματα γένοιτο, TOW καλού το αίσχρόν, και 
τοΰ κατά φυαιν το ιταρα φύαιν ή δε συμβολική 6çajpla και δια των ίναιτιωτάτωμ την τών 
πραγμάτων ενδείκνυται φύσιν. ει τις άρα ποιητής ένθους ίοτίμ κα'ι δια συνθημάτων δηλοΐ 
την περί τών όντων άλήθειαν, ή et τις επιστήμη χρώμενος αυτήν ημΐν εκφαίνει τήν τά^ιν 
τών πραγμάτων, ούτος ούτε piprfnjs èoriv ούτε ελΐγχεαθαι δύνατα( δια τών προκειμένων 
αποδείξεων. 
" T h i s is t h e m a i n a r g u m e n t of t h e fifth d i scourse : In Remp. i. 44 . 2 0 - 3 Sci yàp 
τον μιμητην και τάς ίννοιας οικείας παρε'χεσθαι ΤΟΓΓ πράγμασιν, εικόνας εκείνων είναι 
pouAo/ifVas, και τα ονόματα πρέποντα ταΐς εννοίαις έκλέγεαβαι. However, cf. ί. i g 8 . 26— 
8 ο ποιητής μιμητής· ό μιμητής τρίτος από, της αληθείας· (ό ποιητής άρα τρίτος άπα της 
αληθείας). 
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6-7). How Proclus .managed to reconcile two contradictory views is 
not self-evident. Since preoccupation with symbolism is the main 
theme of the sixth discourse, whereas only imitation is emphasized 
in the fifth, one would be tempted to ascribe the discrepancy to 
the development of Proclus' thought. This is probably correct but 
leaves some questions unanswered, 
Originally συμ/3ολον was a token of recognition.1'' Several passages 
in ancient literature testify to this primary usage of the word." A 
σύμβολον, in accordance with its etymology (from συμβάλλω 'bring 
together'), could be either of the two parts of a broken object (such 
as an ankle-bone or a coin), the perfect fitting of which with one 
another would prove to the bearers that they truly are who they 
claim to be. In this way the symbol has a claim to knowledge un­
derstood Platonically as recognition. From the concrete object the 
word moved in the direction of the concept that we all know. But 
in. ancient times at least, the original meaning remained present as 
an undertone in the theoretical usage of the term. Thus 'symbol* 
always connoted truth, or better expressed, it meant that which 
is conducive to truth, that which leads to truth, and, ultimately, 
the way of truth. In Neoplatonism the concept attained eminence 
with lamblichus. Proclus, following Iamblichus on symbolism,32 
understands by 'symbol' all the properties and aspects of the world 
of the senses that point to the reality above it. Thus the age-old 
rituals and religious practices are thought to be- symbolic of the 
immovable and changeless nature of the gods. Likewise with the 
myths of poetry (cf. In Remp. i. 78. 18-79. 4)· A synonym for 
the Proclan σύμβολον is the word σύνθημα of similar etymology 
(from συντίθημι 'bring together, com-pose'; cf. modern 'synthe­
sis'), for which we have a definition: 'συνθήματα are the sensible 
things that manifest hidden powers, namely the things that them­
selves seen in extended [i.e. material] forms reveal other beings 
" Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (Cam­
bridge, 1986), 31 ff.; Coulter, Microcosm, 60-72. 
" Cf. e.g. Aesch. Ag. 144; Plato, Symp. 191 D; Arist. EE i239b23~32. 
" Proclus"himself is aware of the difference between the Porphyrien and the 
lamblichan interpretative approaches to literature when he says (In Tim. i. 204. 24-
7) Πορφύριοςοε και Ίάμβλιχος τή πάση τοΰ διαλόγου προθέοει αύμφωνον άπεφηναν, 6 
μεν μερικώτερον à δε εποπτικώτερον, In general Proclus prefers universal and holistic 
interpretations, like Iamblichus', to those that tend to be more analytic, as Por­
phyry's are. 
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that cannot be perceived by the senses because they have no sen­
sible form.'30 
Although σύμβολον as a sensible thing is an image, it need not 
'be an ςίκών.*0 The two words have different connotations in accor­
dance with their different etymological derivations and cover only 
partially overlapping semantic fields. etVcuv (from *εΐκω 'resemble, 
look like') is an image to the extent that some images are copies 
that bear a resemblance to an original after which they are fash­
ioned. είκών means simulacrum, replica, ersatz.41 Hence an elxiov is 
the product of mimesis qua mimicry, not of mimesis qua the con­
juring up of a presence: ειίκών is as removed from the represented 
as a copy is from the original. T h e English word 'image' encom­
passes a wider semantic horizon than ΐΐκών because the meaning 
of the modern word is not necessarily reached through the me­
diation of the original-copy syndrome. An 'image' may, but need 
not, have a hidden prototype. The view of a natural setting is its 
own image, which may, but need not, point to something other 
than itself; the manifest content of a dream is a series of psychic 
images which may, but need not, be allusions to a latent content. 
Image is what is perceived by the mind in a visual fashion, εϊκών, by 
contrast, is what is perceived by the mind as a visual image while 
the mind is made aware that what is perceived thereby is only the 
external appearance of a hidden entity or the phenomenal surface 
of a latent power; hence, only an intimation, an imprecise depic­
tion, or even a most accurate copy of its prototype. Re-presentation 
is the salient feature of εικών qua resemblance and mere appear­
ance. Allusion is the salient feature of σύμβολον qua token of re­
cognition.42 Both are images in the most general non-technical 
sense of the term; but whereas εΐκών is the image of something 
distinct from itself, σύμβολον is the image of itself that points to the 
unimaginable 'nature of the gods. The σύμβολον is therefore more 
suggestive than the ΐΐκών, more fit to recall the full range of an 
In Remp. ii. 242. 24-ΐ συνθήματα γάρ τα εμφανή τών αφανών «my δυνάμεων, των 
αμόρφωτων τα εν μορφαΧς όρωμενα διαοταταϊς, 
" Cf. J. Dillon, 'Image, Symbol and Analogy: Three Basic Concepts of Neopla-
tonic Allegorical Exegesis' ['Image'], in R. Baine Harris (ed.), The Significance of 
Neoplatonism (Norfolk, Va„ 1976), 247-62.· 
4 1
 Cf. J.-P. Vernant, Religions, histoires, raisons (Paris, 1979), 105-37. 
" Cf. the clear distinction between είκών and σύμβολον at In Tim. i. 30. 4-14. 
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epoptic vision. Consequently, most myths use symbols rather than 
εικόνες. 
The ζίκών qua replica and simulacrum performs its epistemologi' 
cal function by analogy. Between the copy and the original there is a 
one-to-one correspondence. Thus the εΐκών is more straightforward 
than the symbol but, by the same token, more deceptive. The εΐκών 
is a screen as well as curtain of truth like a transparent garment.4 4 
It simultaneously veils and unveils truth. The άκων reveals in so 
far as it provides the contours, shape, and shade of truth: it out­
lines truth. As in a shadow-theatre,45 on the other hand, the άκων 
hides truth because it allows only, the profiles but not the complete 
natures of true beings to come to sight. By outlining truth an άκων 
foreshadows and shadows at once. In that respect the άκων fulfils 
;the function of keeping truth in its divine pre-eminence as well as 
keeping it from profanation (In Remp. i. 74.20-4; cf. ii. 108.18-19). 
The symbol is an image. Its apprehension is the result of a vision 
of the divine. As an image of the divine the symbol is a condensed 
image, for it can be analysed in conceptual language.' The symbol 
points to, but does not exhaust, that of which it is the symbol. By so 
doing the symbol does not directly imitate the divine. It is allowed to 
represent the powers and activities of the gods by means of actions 
that, if taken literally, are immoral and ignoble (cf. In Remp. i. 73. 
16-74. 3°)· But we know,.Proclus argues, that no blemish, moral or 
otherwise, should be predicated of the divine; we know from Plato 
that error and evil are the results of ignorance and weakness which 
have no models on the intelligible plane (In Remp. i. 27. 9-33. 7; 
37· 23~39 °n Plato, Rep. 379 B-383 c). It follows, therefore, that the 
symbol and, by extension, poetry do not imitate the divine.46 
If the symbol does not imitate the divine, is it the divine or 
0
 In Tim. i. 30. 14—15 και γαρ ο! jiüSoi τα πολλά Sta τών συμβόλων ειωθασι τα 
πράγματα ενδείκνυσθαι. 
" T h e language used by Proclus is very indicative of what he has in m i n d and 
his choice of words very careful. In Remp. i. 73. 12-16 δει δε άρα Tour μύθους, εϊπερ 
μη πανταπασιν αποπεπτωκατες έσονται της εν τοις ούαι αληθείας, άπεικάζεσθαί πως τοις 
πράγμασιν ων άποκρύπτειν τοις φαινομενοις παραπετάσμασι την θεωρίαν έπιχειροϋσιν. Cf. 
L a m b e r t o n , Homer, 185 ff. 
*' In Remp. i. 179. 16—26 ή δό£αυ και φανταοίαις συμμιγνυμένη και δια μιμήσεως συμ-
πληρουμένη και ούδεν ή μιμητική και ούσα και λεγομένη και τότε μεν εικασία προσχρωμένη 
μόνον, τότε δε και φαινομένην προϊσταμένη την άφομοίωαιν, αλλ' ουκ ούααν . . . και τάς τών 
πραγμάτων φύσεις ούχ οίαίπερ εισίν, αλλ' olat φαντααθεϊεν αν τοΐΐ πολλοΐί επιδεικνύουσα' 
σκιαγραάία Tir ούσα τών όντων, αλλ' ου γνώσις ακριβής (cf. Plato, Rep. 602 C—D). 
** In Remp. i. 73 . 11—12 où γαρ έοικότα ^ανείται τα σύμβολα ταύτα ταΐς ύπάρξεαι τών 
θεών. 
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has it no contact with the divine? Both notions should be rejected 
out of hand. Obviously, the symbol is not the divine but indicates 
the divine in a way appropriate for the human mind; the symbol 
is in contact with the gods, it hinges upon them. But the symbol 
exists on a lower level of reality than the divine itself. This lower 
existence of the symbol could only be expressed in Neoplatonic 
language as the product of participation. With the tendency to 
harmonize Plato and Aristotle, the distance between the two notions 
of participation and imitation, though not abolished, was surely 
shortened. The different semantic fields of μείθςξις and μίμησις47 
are made to coincide so that a Neoplatonist (who had, to be sure, 
a predilection for the former Platonic concept) could sometimes 
use them indiscriminately. Thus poetry is imitation. However, in 
ordinary speech imitation refers to imitation of sensible things. 
Symbolic poetry does not imitate worldly things or the objects and 
qualities of sense perception. The first Neoplatonist who seems to 
have applied the concept of direct mimesis of Forms to art and 
to have construed art as the result of an immediate imitation of 
Forms is Plotinus (5. 8. i.,32-40). Proclus follows this intuition. 
The defence of Homer resides in the view that poetry can be mimesis 
without necessarily imitating sensible things. And this is what Proclus 
has in mind: poetry imitates the Forms and symbolizes the divine 
Henads from which the Forms derive.4* 
In Proclus' view, the derogatory Platonic mimesis is always to be 
understood as imitation of sensible things, i.e. of deceptive appear­
ances. Plato never discusses the possibility that poetry may imitate 
the Forms. Now, imitation of Forms is not mimesis in the strict and 
limited sense of the term. But it may be imitation in the sense of 
'having some contact with the archetype'. The poetic symbols, for 
Proclus, are no more divine realities than philosophical concepts are 
divinities. These are ineffable and 'unimaginable'. But both con­
cepts and symbols have affinity with these realities. Otherwise they 
would be arbitrary and artificial signs of human invention. It does 
not seem that Proclus would accept such a modern semiotic theory. 
That σύμβολα may carry allusions without being imitations of ph'ys-
•" Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in the Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy 
(New Haven and London, 1986), 9 ff., esp. 11. 
In Remp. i. 199. 1—2 αύτοΐς σύνεση [sc. ό πρώτιστος και θειότατος ποιητής] τοις 
ούσιν και θεάται την περί τών όντων άλήθειαν; 199- Ι4— Σ6 αλλ' ει και μιμεΐσθαι, φηαίν 
[Plato, Rep. 599 Α3* Ομηρος ικανός και προς τω παραδείγματι τον νουν έχειν και 3Τ0ΐεΓν 
ταύτα α μιμείται. 
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ical things, i.e. without being semblances in the sense that mimetic 
artefacts are semblances, is what can account for the inconsistency 
in Proclus' application of the expression άκων τοΰ τταραοάγματος 
to many a σύμβολον. In these cases άκων should be understood as 
a non-mimetic image, as what conjures up a presence by having 
some affinity with it. 
Proclus' σύμβολον differs substantially from modern 'symbol'. 
The modern semiotic symbol is pre-eminently characterized by its 
systematicity: it derives meaning from its belonging to a system 
where sy'ntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships not only fea­
ture prominently but, more importantly, are a sine qua non for the 
meaningfulness of individual symbols. The modern symbol does 
not have meaning in and by itself. We could not make such an as­
sertion with reference to Proclan σύμβολα. Α σύμβολον'ζ meaning is 
in fact derivative, but no more derivative than anything posterior to 
the Henads is derivative. Α σύμβολον is indeed a sign, as some schol­
ars have said, but a sign whose form, far from being contingent, 
originates in the reality to which the sign refers. Thus designation, 
denotation, and reference belong together. 
The form of the σύμβολον derives from its content and its content 
from its referent. To repeat a familiar example,4' such-and-such a 
cigar as symbol of Churchill has the form that it has because of its 
content, i.e. because it conjures up Churchill's presence, and has 
this particular content because it refers to Churchill, because it has 
Churchill as its referent. The universal function of a σύμβολον is 
the conjuring up of a presence. (Hence function is a contentless 
content, a variable content, that is to say the universal form of the 
content.) The conjuring up of A's specific presence is the specific 
content of the specific σύμβολον a; the conjuring up of B's specific 
presence is the specific content of the specific σύμβολον β, etc. The 
means to the functioning, activation, manifestation of the specific 
content is the specific symbolic form. (Thus a's specific form dif­
fers from ß's according as a's specific content is other than ß's.) 
And the specific symbolic form derives from the specific content, 
which derives from the referent, i.e. from A in the case of a's form, 
from Β in the case of ß's form, etc. Ultimately the referent gives 
both form and content to the σύμβολον. If the cigar-as-symbol-of-
Churchill example does not immediately obey that rule, it is because 
The example is taken from Dillon, 'Image', 250. 
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the symbolized Churchill, as what the cigar refers to, is a sensible 
thing. 
The imagery of poetry refers to the Platonic Forms and conse­
quently provides access to the level of Intellection (Nous), whereas 
the symbolism of mythology reflects the onenesses-above-the-
Forms (i.e. the unifying principles of the Forms themselves) and 
consequently provides direct access to the level of Henads and pos­
sibly indirect access to the level of the One. Strictly speaking, imita­
tive image-making is an intellectual enterprise that could be called 
'disguised philosophy' and 'allusive knowledge-of-Forms'; whereas 
non-imitative symbolism is a non-intellectual understanding that 
could be called 'disguised theology' and 'allusive knowledge-of-
gods'. The former stands or falls according to the power of intel­
ligence that sustains it. The latter transcends the level of thought 
by referring directly to the unifying principles of being with no 
intermediary reference to Ideas. 
The above-mentioned amalgamation of μεθά^ις and μίμηαις was 
not pressed further than the desired harmonization of Plato with 
Aristotle required. The distinction was preserved in so far as it 
could provide interpretative tools for a theoretical understanding 
of myths and symbols. Because a σύμβολον, in Proclus' view, reflects 
the metaphysical level of divine Henads (that is superior to that of 
Forms) without imitating the paradigms of being, its relation to the 
archetypes is characterized by direct participation. By contrast, an 
άκων, being a copy of the original Form, relates to its paradigm by-
means of direct imitation. 
The basic notion that guarantees the functioning of the symbol 
is the relationship of whole to parts. According to Proclus, there 
are three ways in which the concept of wholeness should be un­
derstood.'0 First and foremost, there is the whole above parts, the 
intelligible whole of absolute unity. Every god, as a divine Henad 
(ET 114), is such a whole-above-parts and self-subsisting, abso­
lute identity. Second, there is the whole that consists of parts. This 
is the cosmos in its entirety, the world seen as one living being. 
The being of the senses is a whole-of-parts, unity-in-multiplicity 
and identity-in-difference. The unity and identity of the physical 
PT v. 74. 20-75. 2 o τριττή Βέ εστί [sc. ή τελειότης], το όλον ειπείν ή μεν προ τών 
μερών οίον δή έατιν ή τών θεών τελειότης. . . . ή δε εκ τών μερών iart τελειότης . . , οία 
δη έατι ή του κόσμου τελειότης. . . . τρίτη δε άλλη τελειο'η)ΐ ή εν τοΓΐ μέρεαιν. . . . «is 
δε ουνελόντι φάναι, κα'ι ή τελοο'ττ^ τον αυτοί' τρόπον ττ\ όλότητι διαιρείται, ET 67 πάσα 
ολοτης ή προ τών μερών εοτιν ή εκ τών μερών ή εν τω μέρει. 
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world as a whole are borrowed (from the gods above) but they are 
not partial; for nothing physical is left out. Last and least, there is 
the whole of each particular part. Every particular member of the 
sensible world, the historical Socrates, for example, is such a whole-
among-parts, a whole-in-parts and a ρ art-of-who le. The unity and 
identity of such wholes-in-parts are both borrowed and partial. 
Symbolism aims towards the gods, towards the unimaginable and 
ineffable whole-above-parts. As a matter of course, this aim cannot 
be achieved by means of the whole-of-parts. For the whole-of-parts, 
i.e. the world of the senses in its entirety, cannot be perceived by the 
senses and cannot, therefore, be represented. The whole-of-parts, 
though sensible in itself, yet transcends the capacity of the senses. 
What remains for poetry to use as symbols is particulars, wholes-
in-parts. And this is what poetry does. It uses symbolic images 
as a means to the end of visualizing the divine principles which, 
operating outside space, permeate all places and spaces of physical 
reality. What allows a physical particular to become a symbol and 
an image of the divine is the very ontòlogical structure of reality. 
Reality does not have parts deprived of all wholeness and of all unity. 
All parts of the world are simultaneously microcosmic wholes. Any 
physical part may become a symbol because it essentially reflects 
the structure of the whole-above-parts. 
But there is more to symbolism than the microcosmic-macro-
cosmic relation. There is also appropriateness. According to a fa-
mous maxim of Proclus (who follows Porphyry here),5' 'everything 
is in everything, but in the appropriate manner for each thing'.52 
This means that each particular thing has all the characteristics of 
all things in a more or less pronounced way according to its own 
nature. There is universal sympathy of all parts with one another 
and with the whole of which they are parts. This doctrine is fun-
damental for Proclus' view on the rituals of traditional religion and 
on the symbolism of theurgy." The parts reproduce the whole in 
" Cf. P o r p h . Sent, ad intell. due. i o . 
t3
 ET 103 πάντα iv πάσι, αικείως δε εν έκάστω. Cf. ΡΤ ϋ . $(>. ι6—21 πάσι γαρ 
ενέσπειρεν ό τών όλων αΓτιοΓ της εαυτού παντελούς υπεροχής συνθήματα, και δια τούτων 
περί εαυτόν ϊΒρυοε τα πάντα, κοί νάρεατιν άρρήτως πάσιν άφ' όλων εξηρημένας. έκαστον 
οΰν εις το της έαυτοΰ φύσεως άρρητον εισΒυόμενον ευρίσκει το σύα^ολον του πάντων 
πατρός. —- j . 
" Cf. Sacr. 148. 5 — t o και αϊ Ιερατικοί άπα της tv τοϊς φαινομένοις άπααι συμ­
παθείας προς τε άλληλα και προς τάς αφανείς δυνάμεις, πάντα εν πασι κατανοήσαντες, 
την έπιατήμην την ίερατικήν συνεστήσαντο, θαυμάααντες τω βλέπειν εν τε τοίί πρώτοις 
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their inner structure. Any physical object can become a symbol 
of an aspect of the divine according to the object's nature. Since 
some divine qualities are more prominent in some things than in 
others, it follows that some things are more appropriate to sym­
bolize some divine attributes than others. Thus sensible/physical 
things are images and symbols at once: they are images because 
they copy the Forms; and they are symbols because they allude to 
the ontologically antecedent divine realities. Aliquid stat pro aliquo 
is the general law of symbolism. T h e more precise form of that 
law (especially when reference is made to religious symbols) is pars 
pro toto. Proclus modifies the general law of symbolism by endow­
ing the symbolic part with the status of the whole. It can be said 
that symbolism is for Proclus the application of metaphysics to the 
problem of truth in poetry. What makes the σύμβολον more than a 
merely artificial symbol is the fact that the σύμβολον, taken in itself, 
i.e. apart from paradigmatic and systematic relationships, is a whole 
in its own right. The symbol is not an artificial pars pro toto but a 
natural pars tota pro toto toto. 
The locus classicus in Proclus' corpus where the philosopher 
speaks ex professo about the ways of knowledge or what he terms 
'modes of theology' (τρόποι της περί των θΐίων διδασκαλίας) is the 
fourth chapter of the first book of his Platonic Theology." Proclus 
divides knowledge of divine principles into allusive cognition (oV 
ίνδάξίως) and uncovered understanding (άπαρακαλύπτως), and dis­
tinguishes no fewer than four separate modes of theology. Allusive 
cognition can be either mythico-symbolic (συμβολικώς και μυθικώς) 
or iconic (δι1 άκόνων), whereas unveiled understanding can be either 
scientific (κατ* ίπιστημην) or revelatory (κατά την êV θεών htittvauw). 
As was to be expected, the scientific mode is identified with dialec­
tic, the proper mode of exposition and peculiar domain of philo­
sophy sensu stricto, whereas the revelatory mode is exemplified by 
τα έσχατα και εν τοις εσχάτοίς τά πρώτιστα, εν ούρανω μεν τά χβομια κατ' αίτ'αν και 
ούρανίως, εν τε yiy τά ουράνια γηΐνως. 
ΡΤ ι. 17. ι8—24 ραιμεται γαρ ου τον αυτόν πανταχού τρόπον μετιών την περί τών 
θείων δίδασκαλίαν, αλλ' ότε μεν ένθεαστικώς ότε δε Βιαλεκτικώς άνελίττων την περί αυτών 
αληθειαν, και ποτέ* μεν συμβολικώς έξαγγέλλων τάς άρρητους αυτών ιδιότητας, ποτέ Se 
αττο των εικόνων επ αυτούς ανατρέχων και τάς πρωτουργούς εν αυτοις αιτίας τών όλων 
ανευρίσκων. ΡΤ ί. 2ο. 1-5 of μεν γαρ St* ενδείξεως περί τών θείων λέγοντες ή συμβο­
λικώς κα'ι μυθικώς ή St εικόνων λέγουαιν, οι δε άπαρακαλύπτως τάς εαυτών διάνοjjociç 
άπαγγέλλοντες οι μεν κατ' έπιατήμην οι δε' «ατά την εκ θεών επίπνοιαν ποιούνται row 
λόγους. 
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theurgy and the Chaldaean Oracles. It would be beside the point of 
this paper to go into a detailed analysis of these four modes. We are 
principally concerned with allusive knowledge, which in Proclus 
view does not seem, to be essentially inferior to overt knowledge. 
Images and symbols are inferior to concepts and divine revelations 
only to the extent that their essentially allusive character may some­
times be missed. The symbols and myths that Proclus has in mind 
when he makes the ex professo classification of theological modes 
are those of Orphic cosmologies and similar mythologies about the 
origin of gods. His images, on the other hand, are the images of 
Pythagorean mathematics, which imitate, rather than directly un­
veil, the divine principles (PT i. 20. 6-25; cf. iii. 17. 23—18. 3). It 
is plain that Proclus' nuanced analysis cuts very differently from 
any modern semiotic theory, since the theurgic myths and rituals 
are not regarded as symbolic while the Orphic counterparts are. 
What is of importance for our understanding of Proclan symbolism 
is that a symbol can refer to a reality without necessarily imitating 
that of which it is a symbol and moreover without deriving its in­
telligibility by means of an artificial system of invented signs. The 
symbol, no less than the concept, is meaningful because it stands 
in intimate and necessary relation to the symbolized as the human 
concept stands in such a relation to its original Idea. 
4. The core of the argument 
What lies beneath Proclus' treatment of poetry, Proclus' own ΰττό-
νοιαι, could be recaptured along the following lines. (The difference 
between the level of divine Henads and that of godlike forms, so 
essential for the metaphysics of Proclus, is here discarded for the 
purpose of clarification.) 
There is meaning. Meaning is intelligible being (νόημα). (You can 
call it substance if you like, provided that you do not understand 
substance, pace Descartes, as a generic term that comprises rescogi-
tans and res extensa: substance for the Platonists refers to intelligible 
being alone, to res cogitata.) When intelligible being is cognized it 
generates concepts. Concepts are subsequently expressed in lan­
guage andJare mediated by words. Words are intelligible in so far 
as they refer to concepts. Concepts are valid in so far as they are 
sustained by meaning. Philosophy sets itself the task of ascending 
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to concepts through the use of words. Philosophy is the array of 
•linguistic concepts and the array of conceptual language. 
Again: there is meaning. Meaning is intelligible being. When in-
telligible being is visually apprehended, it produces images, which 
can be seen and also described. Description takes place through 
language, which consists of words. The words refer to the image 
and the image refers to intelligible being. The image possesses con-
temporaneity and simultaneity of its various elements. Language, 
by contrast, possesses linear temporality and sequentiality. When 
language describes an image, it presents the simultaneous as se-
quential.33 This is what poetry does. When reference is made to the 
divine in mythology, the temporal 'then' should be understood as 
a causal and logical 'then'. Temporal succession in myth indicates 
a causal dependence on the higher planes of reality. Poetry is the 
array of linguistic imagery and the array of symbolic language, 
Both philosophy and poetry use language. Philosophy uses lan-
guage in order to attain to concepts; poetry uses language in order to 
attain to images. Both images and concepts originate in meaning. 
The logical concatenation of concepts is philosophical ratiocina-
tion. The visual concatenation of images is poetic myth. The event 
of myth derives from the apprehension of the image which is the 
manifestation of meaning. The event of rationality derives from 
the cognition of the concept which is the manifestation of mean-
ing. Both philosophy and poetry are means to the end of cognition. 
They both stand or fall according to whether or not they are in 
contact with meaning.5* 
The historical growth of philosophy dealt a hard blow to poetry. 
Philosophy assumed that reference to concepts is higher than refer-
ence to images, i.e. that it has more immediate contact with mean-
" Cf. Lamberton, Homer, 171. 
" Wang Pi (AD 226-59), one of the most non-scholastic and original thinkers 
to have commented on the Chinese / Ching, has left us precious insights OR the 
relationship of words and images and their dependence on meaning: 'The images 
arise from the meaning, but if one retains only the images then what is retained 
are not the right images. The words arise from the images, but if one retains only 
the words then what is retained are not the right words. Thus only by forgetting 
the images can one grasp the meaning, and only by forgetting the words can one 
grasp the images' (quoted by Hellmut Wilhelm, in Understanding the I Ching: The 
Wilhelm Lectures on The Book of Changes, trans. Cary F. Baynes (Princeton, 1995), 
i n ) . Here the words are subordinated to the images, as is appropriate to poetry, 
and the images to meaning. In philosophy, by contrast, the words are subordinated 
to concepts and the concepts to meaning. 
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ing. The concept was given priority over the image.5' Historically-
speaking, intelligible being gave birth first to images and only then 
to concepts in the matrix of human consciousness. But the concept, 
once, discovered, did not remain in a state of subordination for a 
long time, nor was it satisfied with a status equal to that of the im-
age. Hence it arrogantly placed itself between meaning and image. 
(Poetry always assumed that the imaginary space between meaning 
and image is too small to be occupied by anything at all, or rather 
non-existent.) The result of the arrogant claim of philosophy is ra-
tionalism. Rationalism is the overvaluation of the concept vis-à-vis 
the image. Rationalism is the mode of thought that takes its exis-
tence from the predominance of the concept. To think rationally 
is to think in the mode of ratio. Its opposite is not, as is often as-
sumed, irrational thinking. The opposite of rationalism is symbolic 
thinking. To think symbolically is to think in the mode of σύμβολον, 
to think with reference to images rather than concepts, to think 
mythically and poetically. 
In contradistinction to the prevailing interpretation of Middle 
and, perhaps, Old Platonism5* but in accordance with both the 
Platonic and the Neoplatonic views,5* the Platonic Idea, in Proclus' 
eyes, is not an idea. It is neither concept nor notion nor a single 
thought as perceived by the mind: it is the true being that possesses 
the form of its intelligibility within itself; it is being that has form 
not by participation but from its own very existence. The Platonic 
Idea is Existential Form—ουσ(ι)α. 
If one approaches the Idea from the perspective of conceptual 
thinking, from the perspective of ratio, the Idea is cognized as a 
concept. If one approaches the Idea from the perspective of picto­
rial thinking, from the perspective of σύμβολον, the idea is cognized 
1 7
 According to a very suggestive doxographical anecdote recorded by Diogenes 
Laertius (3. 5), Plato was originally a poet. At the age of 20, when he first met 
Socrates, Plato had already to his credit a fair production of dithyrambs, tragedies, 
and melic poems. The encounter with the wise man of ignorance, however, was 
so fascinating that the young man repudiated his poetic past and consigned all his 
poems to the flames of Hephaestus to rest in oblivion. Se non è vero è ben trovato: 
the fire of reason consumes the artistic imagery of symbolic intuition. 
*• Cf. J. Dillon, The Midolle Platonists (Ithaca, NY, 1977), 29, 94, 201. 
" An exception should be allowed for Plotinus, who thought that the Ideas are 
inside the Intellect, a doctrine that caused trouble to many Neoplatonists, beginning 
with Plotinus' own disciple Porphyry ( V. Plot. 18). For the origin of this doctrine see 
A. H. Armstrong, 'The Background of the Doctrine "That the Intelligibles are not 
Outside the Intellect'", in Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, 
5; Vandœuvres-Genève, 1960), 391-425. 
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as an image. Philosophy approaches the Idea from the viewpoint 
of the concept. It thus conceptualizes and rationalizes the Idea. 
Poetry approaches the Idea from the viewpoint of the image. It 
thus 'imagines' and symbolizes the Idea. 
5. Some conclusions 
Proclus puts Homer the supreme poet on an equal footing with 
Plato the supreme philosopher because he believes that symbolism 
is not inferior to conceptualism. He thus solves a Platonic prob-
lem which modern scholarship has repeatedly detected.60 When 
Socrates declares that poetry is inadequate and misleading, and 
also possibly false since it stands at a third remove from truth, he 
assumes that imitation can only be imitation of participating things, 
of things, that is, participating in the Idea. It does not seem' to 
have occurred to him that the imitative character of poetry may 
refer not to sensible things but, instead, to the Ideas themselves; 
in other words, that poetry may indeed imitate, but imitate not 
participating things but the participated Ideas. This possibility is 
never investigated in the three books of the Republic that deal with 
poetry. However, a passage from the sixth book" indicates that for-
Plato the possibility that art may imitate 'the divine paradigm', 
rather than the sensible copies, cannot be excluded a priori. The 
context makes it clear that art is brought forth in the discussion as a 
metaphor meant to illuminate the expected actions of the philoso-
phers when they decide to rule the state. The arguments employed 
here are not concerned with art per se. The logical possibility that 
seems to be forgotten in the proper discussions on the value of art 
is here taken into, account.62 However, Plato's view is that, strictly 
*° Cf. e.g. Grube, Thought, 202; S. Rosen, The Quarrel between Philosophy and 
Poetry (New York and London, 1988), 6. The insightful interpretation of the Pla-
tonic view of art by W. J. Verdenius ('Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation', in G, 
Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ii (Notre Dame, Ind., 1978), 
259-73» esp. 270) resolves the difficulty in a manner similar to (but different from) 
that suggested by Proclus without any recourse to him; cf. W. J. Oates, Plato's View 
of Art (New York, 1972), 5S-61. Cf. also the reconciliation of the apparently diver-
gent Platonic views on imitation by J. Tate, ' "Imitation" in Plato's Republic', CQ 22 
(1928), 16-23, and 'Plato and "Imitation"', CQ zd (1932), 161-9, and the analysis 
by D. R. Grey, 'Art in the Republic', Philosophy, 27 (1952), 291-310. 
" Plato, Rep. 500 b. 
" The view that thispassage, corroborated by other Platonic passages, represents 
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speaking, the kind of 'art' that imitates the Forms is not art, but 
philosophy.*3 
Plato nowhere states that art imitates the Ideas, although he does 
claim that only knowledge of the Ideas can produce, by means of 
imitation, truly beautiful things.44 His view seems to bethat even 
though there is nothing that (onto-)logically prevents art from imi-
tating the Ideas, existing art does not in actual fact do so. Proclus 
detects the Platoniq gap, understands its importance for interpreta-
tive purposes, and elaborates on it. If poetry imitâtes the Ideas, he 
seems to claim, then poetry is not further removed from truth than 
sensible things are, and is as ontologically worthy of respect and 
epistemologically valid as philosophy is. For philosophy, according 
to the prevalent Greek view, is a longing for wisdom, not wisdom 
;tself.*J Philosophy which does not coincide with the Ideas but cog-
nizes the Ideas is, then, no better than poetry. What differentiates 
philosophy from poetry is their respective means of attaining to 
the common end of cognition and apprehending the metaphysical 
principles of reality: concept versus symbol. 
In all ancient literary exegesis for which Proclus can be said 
to have been the late antique spokesman, the aim and purpose of 
literature does not lie in literature itself. Classical literature, be-
fore becoming classical in the strict Renaissance sense, was always 
considered to have a scope which lies objectively outside its own 
territory. The conception of literature as 'quite useless' in the fa-
mous expression of Oscar Wtlde, and the corresponding stance of 
the aesthete summarized in the aphorism l'art pour l'art, would be 
totally unintelligible to the ancient mind. Literature, the ancients 
thought, has a value according to the degree of its usefulness, which 
can in turn be determined by means of criteria that are not created 
by the sheer existence of the work of art.66 The theory of mimesis 
the real, albeit hidden, stance of Plato on art, namely that art is imitation of Forms, is 
suggested by many modern scholars. See e.g. L. Golden, 'Plato's Concept of Mime-
sis', British Journal of Aesthetics, 15 (1975), 118-31; V. Goldschmidt, 'Le problème 
de la tragédie d'après Platon', in Questions platoniciennes (Paris, 1970), 103-40; W. C 
Greene, 'Plato's View on Poetry', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 29 (1918), 
1-75-
" Cf. A. Nehamas, 'Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10', in J. Moravcsik 
and Ph. Temko (eds.), Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts (Totowa, NJ, 1982), 
47-78, esp. 58-60. 
** Cf. Plato, Symp. 212 A; Phdr. 278 c; Gorg. 503 D; Polii. 300D-E. 
*' Cf. Plato, Phdr. 278 D. 
" R. G. Collingwood's view ('Plato's Philosophy of Art', Mind, 34(1925), 154-72 
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was one attempt at positing the standard by which literature is to be 
judged. The theory of symbolism, intimately related to imitation 
but exploring different possibilities in the relationship of copy to 
model, was another. At any rate, literature was regarded as intend-
ing something that exists objectively, either by holding up a mirror 
to nature and copying the sensible world (thus rendering the out-
lines and contours of objects sharper and more readily perceivable), 
or by using this very sensible world of appearances as a tool in the 
process of transcending the world's deception and ascending to the 
realm of true being.67 
As Nelson Goodman showed in his Languages of Art,ts there 
is no such thing as universal representation. All art is ultimately 
symbolic. What is mimetic and representational in one set of signs 
characteristic of an art is not recognized as such in another set of 
signs and another art. Mimesis is relative to context. The highly 
'mimetic' depiction of a person in a photographic picture, is not 
recognized as a depiction of that person by whoever cannot read 
the symbolic system involved. Imitation of reality is the imitation 
of the reality that a culture creates, establishes, and sustains. 
When a symbolic image first springs to mind its meaning is ma-
nifest. The myths of the entire epic poetry satisfied Homer's and 
Hesiod's minds as well as the eyes and ears of their audience. Until 
at least the sixth century they had attracted no censure and there 
was therefore no need to account for the myths' correctness and 
didactic and aesthetic sublimity. The poetic symbol shines forth 
without any need of mediation by philosophers or literary critics in 
so far as it finds immediate response in the hearts of those to whom 
it is presented. The primal 'tautegorical'6* function of poetry con-
at 159), though attributed to Plato, is obviously un-Platonic: '[the work of art is] an 
object sui generis . . . to be judged . . . by a standard peculiar to itself. 
*' The nuanced analysis of three streams of ancient literary exegesis by Coulter, 
Microcosm, .5-31, to which I am particularly indebted, does not pay due attention 
to the fact that even what he calls 'genre criticism' presupposes a reference outside 
the text. The cathartic function of tragedy, for instance (and that is what Coulter 
has not paid sufficient attention to), is determined by the natural constitution of 
things (including man's psychic constitution), which stipulates that purification of 
passions can take place only by encountering passions. And it is this objective reality 
thai provides criteria whereby a particular tragic drama (e.g. Oedipus Rex) can be 
regarded as the perfect model of tragedy as such. 
" N. Goodman, Languages of Art. znd edn. (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1976). 
" 11 was Schelling who first made abundant use of this paradoxical term coined by 
Coleridge, in his Introduction to a Philosophy of Mythology. In the present .century 
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sists in the fact that its images are manifest: they are immediately 
understood. There is as yet ho distinction between explicit mean-
ing, on the one hand, and implicit intention and reference, on the 
other. The poetic image is the thing. When later that distinction 
springs to the surface of human consciousness, there arises simulta-
neously a need to relate the external course of mythical events, now 
understood as other than the myth in itself, with the internal scope 
of the poetic work. To that effect a new apparatus is being forged— 
the conceptual apparatus—and a new mode of exposition is being 
devised—writing in prose—which must necessarily be other than 
the visual apparatus (i.e. the images) and the mode of exposition 
(i.e. the diction) of poetry. When the Split has reached its ultimate 
conclusion, there is no other way of recapturing the lost symbolism 
of the past. It now appears dim, confused, and confusing, requir-
ing an interpretative mediation which, qua mediation, is bound to 
remain allegorical. If full grasping of the obsolete poetic symbol-
ism is still possible, it must proceed through the allegorical, i.e. 
the interpretative, efforts that explicate the poetic text in question 
in order to shake its opacity and restore it to its assumed original 
manifestedness. The various allegorical readings and the conver-
gent, divergent, or opposite views which they suggest constitute 
the ongoing philosophical discourse as the indispensable means to 
the end of conceptualist apprehension of poetic symbolism. 
The Athenian school of Neoplatonism elaborated a theory of 
symbolism which bypassed, without neglecting, the mimetic pit-
falls. Poetry's imagery is now considered to consist of excellently 
devised symbols that allude to the profundity of things divine. Such 
a radical reinterpretation of Homer amounts to the invention of a 
new set of signs. These signs aimed to stress the relevance of tradi-
tional myths in a period when the old reading practices had become 
less effective as they continually caused intellectual turbulence. It 
is customary to assume that the old practices of reading were more 
genuine because they were supposedly based on face-value mean-
ing. But it is salutary to be reminded (by Goodman, for instance) 
that so-called face-value meaning is the kind of representation that 
we recognize. Familiarity with Neoplatonic allegorism may shake 
the only classical scholar, to my knowledge, to have taken Schelling's discovery 
seriously and employed it in his own work on religion and myth is Walter Otto: ef, 
W. Otto, Essais sur le mythe (Paris, 1987). 
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that conviction about.the exclusive genuineness of so-called non-
allegorical interpretations, as acceptance of the Wolfian critique, 
the studies of Milman Parry, and the recent performance theories 
has changed our ways of approaching and aesthetically appreciating 
Homer. 
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